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Abstract
Background: Tumor heterogeneity is documented for many characters, including the 
production of growth factors, one of the hallmarks of cancer. What maintains 
heterogeneity remains an open question that has implications for diagnosis and 
treatment, as drugs that target growth factors are susceptible to the evolution of 
resistance. 
Methods: I use evolutionary game theory to model collective interactions between cancer 
cells, to analyse the dynamics of the production of growth factors and the eﬀect of 
therapies that reduce their amount. 
Results: Five types of dynamics are possible, including the coexistence of producer and 
non-producer cells, depending on the production cost of the growth factor, on its 
diﬀusion range and on the degree of synergy of the benefit it confers to the cells. 
Perturbations of the equilibrium mimicking therapies that target growth factors are 
eﬀective in reducing the amount of growth factor in the long term only if the reduction 
is extremely eﬃcient and immediate.
Conclusion: Collective interactions within the tumor can maintain heterogeneity for the 
production of growth factors and explain why therapies like anti-angiogenic drugs and 
RNA interference that reduce the amount of available growth factors are eﬀective in the 
short term, but often lead to relapse. Alternative strategies for evolutionarily stable 
treatments are discussed.
Keywords: cancer; anti-cancer therapy; evolutionary game theory; growth factors; 
public goods; cooperation; somatic evolution; heterogeneity; polymorphism.
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Introduction
Self-suﬃciency of growth factor production is one of the hallmarks of cancer [Hanahan 
& Weinberg 2000] and, like for other characters, there is evidence of intra-tumor 
heterogeneity in the ability of cells to produce growth factors [Achilles et al. 2001, 
Marusyk & Polyak 2010]. Jouanneau et al. [1994] have shown that tumor cells 
cooperate for the production of FGF, that is, cells that do not produce the growth factor 
can benefit from the products of their neighbours. Since they are diﬀusible molecules, it 
stands to reason that this is the case for other growth factors as well [Axelrod et al. 
2006]. What maintains heterogeneity? Given that cancer progression is a process of 
clonal selection [Cairns 1975, Nowell 1976, Crespi & Summers 2005, Merlo et al. 2006, 
Greaves & Maley 2012] in which cells compete for resources, space and nutrients, how 
can more than one clone stably coexist in a neoplasm? Current explanations include the 
possibility that diﬀerent clones are evolutionarily neutral [Iwasa & Michor 2011], 
specialize on diﬀerent niches [Gatenby & Gillies 2008, Nagy 2004] or are not in 
equilibrium [Gonzales-Garcia et al. 2002]; which, if any, of these mechanisms are at 
work in neoplasms remains an open question [Merlo et al. 2006]. 
 Heterogeneity has also implications for disease progression [Maley et al. 2006], 
diagnosis and therapy [Dexter & Leith 1986]. Since diagnostic biopsies sample only a a 
small region of the tumor, treatments based upon such samples might not be eﬀective 
against all tumor cells. Understanding the origin, extent and dynamics of tumor 
heterogeneity therefore is essential for the development of successful anti-cancer 
therapies. It has been suggested that treatments that attack growth factors may be less 
susceptible than traditional drugs to the evolution of resistance [Pepper 2012, Aktipis & 
Nesse 2013]. Current drugs that target growth factors, however, like the anti-angiogenic 
drug Avastin, extend overall survival by only a few months [Amit et al. 2013], as 
resistance often arises. 
 We develop a model of growth factor production in the framework of evolutionary 
game theory and show how the evolutionary dynamics of the system can explain the 
maintenance of stable heterogeneity, how this aﬀects the development of resistance to 
anti-cancer therapies that target growth factors, and the implications for the 
development of stable therapies.
 A fundamental analytical method in evolutionary biology, game theory has often 
been mentioned [e.g.: Gatenby & Maini 2003, Merlo et al. 2006, Axelrod et al. 2006, 
Lambert et al. 2011, Basanta & Deutsch 2008] as a promising avenue for cancer 
research, but only a few papers actually develop game theoretic models of cancer. 
Tomlinson [1997] and Tomlinson & Bodmer [1997] developed a mathematical model 
of a population consisting of two types of cells, with one type producing a factor which 
confers a proliferative advantage to both cells. Subsequent papers have extended this 
model up to four types of cells [Dingli et al. 2009, Basanta et al. 2008a,b, 2011, 2012, 
Gerstung et al. 2011] and allowing stochastic and spatial eﬀects [Bach et al. 2003]. 
ese models, however, describe interactions between pairs of cells, whereas interactions 
among cancer cells are not normally pairwise, and should be described by public goods 
games (PGGs) with collective interactions. It is known that results from the theory of 
two-player games cannot be extended to multi-player PGGs and that this can actually 
lead to fundamental misunderstandings [Archetti & Scheuring 2012].
 Models of PGGs in evolutionary game theory, on the other hand [reviewed by 
Archetti & Scheuring 2012] assume that the benefit of the public good is a linear 
function of the number of contributors (the N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma: NPD) or a 
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step function with a fixed threshold [Archetti 2009a,b]. Because the eﬀect of enzyme 
production is generally a saturating function of its concentration [e.g.: Hemker & 
Hemker 1969, Ricard & Noat 1986, Mendes 1997, Eungdamrong & Iyengar 2004], 
however, the public good produced by growth factors is likely to be a sigmoid function 
of the number of producer cells. We must therefore resort to a model with sigmoid 
benefits, which has been so far beyond the reach of evolutionary game theory [Archetti 
& Scheuring 2011, 2012]. Since the dynamics of the NPD and that of threshold PGGs 
is radically diﬀerent, it is not clear a priori, what the dynamics of PGGs with sigmoid 
benefits could be. 
 e model we use here, therefore, goes beyond current game theory models of 
cancer in that it is a multi-player, collective action (public goods) game, rather than a 
game with two players; and it goes beyond standard models in evolutionary biology in 
that it assumes non-linear, sigmoid benefits, and investigates the eﬀect of therapies that 
aﬀect the dynamics. To make the analysis possible we must assume that cells maintain a 
large and constant population size, which may describe cancer cell populations that have 
reached a carrying capacity, due for example to resource limitation or immune response. 
e model is relevant for insulin-like growth factor (IGF) and other growth factors that 
confer a direct benefits by inducing a growth advantage or by protecting against 
apoptosis. Other growth factors like vascular endothelial growth factors (VEGF), whose 
benefit less direct will have more complicated dynamics.
Methods
We consider the case in which cells can be either producers of the growth factor 
(cooperators; C) or non-producers (defectors; D); producers pay a cost c > 0, and the 
benefit b(j) for a cell is an increasing function of the number of contributor cells j in the 
group (of size n) defined by the diﬀusion range of the growth factor, that is, Δ∆bj=b(j+1)-
b(j)>0 for j=0, … , n-1. More specifically, we assume that the benefit function has a 
sigmoid shape (for a given j*, j≤j*?Δ∆bj+1≥Δ∆bj, j≥j* ?Δ∆bj+1≤Δ∆bj). We use the simplest and 
most natural sigmoid function, the logistic function b(j)=1/[1+es(k-j)], where k is the 
inflection point at which the function has steepness s (with 0<k≤n and s>0). A 
normalised version of the logistic function, given by bN(j)=[b(j)-b(0)]/[b(n)-b(0)], 
delivers the case of a fixed threshold (a benefit is produced if and only if at least k 
producers are present; s→∞) and of a linear function (s→0) as limit cases. In a large 
population with no assortment, we can approximate the analysis by assuming an infinite, 
well-mixed population, and the fitnesses of producers and of a non-producers are given 
by, respectively
πC (x) =
n −1
j
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ x j (1− x)n−1− j
j=0
n−1
∑ ⋅b( j +1)− c
π D (x) =
n −1
j
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ x j (1− x)n−1− j
j=0
n−1
∑ ⋅b( j)
where 0≤x≤1 is the fraction of producers in the population, since a producer pays a cost c 
that a non-producer does not pay, but its group has one more contributor (itself ). 
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 In a clonal populations, the replicator dynamics [Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998] of 
this game is given by
 x = x(1− x) ⋅[β(x)− c]         (1)
where the fitness diﬀerence πC (x)−π D (x)  is written in the form β(x)− c , and
β(x) = n −1j
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ x j (1− x)n−1− j
j=0
n−1
∑ ⋅Δbj       (2)
e dynamics (1) has two trivial rest points x=0 and x=1; further possible, interior rest 
points are given by the roots of the equations 
β(x)− c = 0          (3)
For the logistic function (or any other sigmoid function), an exact analytical solution is 
not possible. Because β(x) is a polynomial in Bernstein form, however, we can resort to 
the properties of Bernstein polynomials [Lorentz 1953, Philips 2003] to characterize 
the dynamics and find an approximate solution. 
 e benefit for having a fraction x of cooperators is b(x)=1/[1+ens(h-x)], the extension 
of b(j/n) to all x ∈[0,1], with h=k/n. Because β(x) is a Bernstein polynomial [Bernstein 
1912, Lorentz 1953, Philips 2003] of the coeﬃcient Δ∆bj=b((j+1)/n)-b(j/n), by Bernstein 
theorem [Bernstein 1912] we know that β(x) converges uniformly to Δ∆bj in [0,1]. 
Furthermore, because Δ∆bj is the forward diﬀerence of the benefit function with spacing 
1/n, for large enough n we can approximate Δ∆bj≈(1/n)b'(j/n). For any x, j/n converges in 
probability to x as n→∞, therefore by Bernstein theorem β(x) converges to (1/n)b'(x), 
and eq. (3) can be approximated by 
(1/n)b'(x)-c=0            (4)
We can obtain an analogous solution using (4) for the normalised benefit function bN(x), 
and actually for any sigmoid function.
 Because of the variation-diminishing property of Bernstein polynomials, we also 
know that the number of internal equilibria of β is less than the number of sign changes 
of Δ∆b by an even amount; because of our assumption of sigmoid benefits, we know that 
β(x) has a unique maximizer x* in (0,1); finally, because of the end-point values property, 
we know that β(0)=Δ∆b0 and β(1)=Δ∆bn-1. 
Results
It follows that x=0 is a stable rest point of (1) if and only if Δ∆b0<c, and that x=1 is a 
stable rest point of (1) if and only if Δ∆bn-1≥c. In addition, any interior stable rest point xs 
must satisfy (3) and β'(xs)<0. It follows that there is at most one interior stable rest point 
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xs and that, if such a rest point exists, it satisfies x*<xs<1. ese conclusions define, for 
any sigmoid benefit function, the following five types of dynamics (Figure 1), where we 
simplify notation by defining β*= β(x*):
• If c> β*, then β(x)<c ∀x , and x=0 is the only stable equilibrium.
• If c<Min[Δ∆b0, Δ∆bn-1], then β(x)>c ∀x , and x=1 is the only stable equilibrium.
• If Min[Δ∆b0,Δ∆bn-1]<c<Max[Δ∆b0,Δ∆bn-1], and Δ∆b0<Δ∆bn-1, then β(x)>c for x>xu and β(x)<c 
for x<xu; therefore the unique interior unstable equilibrium xu divides the basin of 
attraction of the two stable equilibria x=1 and x=0.
• If Min[Δ∆b0,Δ∆bn-1]<c<Max[Δ∆b0, Δ∆bn-1], and Δ∆b0>Δ∆bn-1, then β(x)>c for x<xs and β(x)<c 
for x>xs; therefore the unique interior stable equilibrium xs divides the basin of 
attraction of the two unstable equilibria x=1 and x=0.
• If Max[Δ∆b0, Δ∆bn-1]<c< β* then β(x)>c for xu<x<xs, while β(x)<c for x<xu and for x>xs; 
therefore the interior unstable equilibrium xu divides the basins of attraction of the 
two stable equilibria x=0 and x=xs.
 e internal equilibria for the normalised logistic function are given by (from eq. 4)
 
x± = h −
s
n
log
1 ± 1 − 4cs ⋅B
2cs ⋅B
− 1
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
       (5)
with xs=x- for the stable equilibrium and xu=x+ for the unstable equilibrium, where 
B=b(1)-b(0). 
  e results described so far reveal that stable heterogeneity can arise simply as a 
consequence of the fact that growth factors are diﬀusible public goods. Stable 
heterogeneity is more likely to occur for low levels of h (that is, when few producer cells 
are enough to confer a benefit to the whole group) [Figure 2].
  To conclude the comparative statics of the system, we note that [Figure 3] the 
equilibrium frequency of producers is always a decreasing function of c (the cost of 
production) and n (the number of cells within the diﬀusion range of the growth factor); 
the eﬀect of s (the steepness of the benefit function) is more complex, as the equilibrium 
can be a monotonic or a single peaked function of s depending on the other parameters 
(it is clear however, that stable heterogeneity is possible only if s is not too low); finally, 
the equilibrium frequency of producers is an increasing function of h (the inflection of 
the benefit function). is has a implications for the dynamics of anti-cancer therapies 
that target growth factors and for the evolution of resistance against such therapies.
 An anti-cancer drug that acts by impairing growth factors will increase the amount 
of growth factors that the cells must produce to achieve a certain benefit, that is, it will 
increase h. If the threshold is high, producers can go to fixation, whereas they remain at 
a mixed equilibrium if the threshold is lower (compare, for example, Figure 1B and 1D). 
at is, an anti-cancer drug that acts by reducing the amount of circulating growth 
factor may lead to the opposite of the desired eﬀect: while the immediate eﬀect is, of 
course, a sudden reduction in tumor growth (because there are not enough circulating 
growth factors) the amount of growth factors that must be produced to achieve the same 
benefit (h) is now increased; this leads to an increase in frequency of the C cells, which 
eventually leads to a new equilibrium [Figure 4]. In case of bistability the final outcome 
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will depend on the initial frequency of producers.
 Even if a drug induces an almost complete annihilation of available growth factors, 
the speed of the transition from the original to the new threshold is essential for the 
success of the therapy. While a fast transition to the new threshold can lead to a 
successful, stable therapy, a slower delivery of the anti - growth factor drug, or ineﬃcient 
RNAi delivery systems that require multiple treatments over an extended period of 
time, can make the system evolve back to relapse, even if the treatment itself is extremely 
eﬃcient at impairing the growth factor [Figure 5A]. Even therapies that are almost 
immediately eﬀective will fail if the reduction in circulating growth factor is not large 
enough [Figure 5B].
Conclusion
Analysing the production of growth factors as a non-linear public goods game reveals 
that tumor heterogeneity can be maintained by the frequency-dependent selection that 
arises as a natural consequence of the fact that growth factors are diﬀusible, and 
therefore public goods, with no need to invoke neutral mutations [Iwasa & Michor 
2011], niche specialization [Gatenby & Gillies 2008, Nagy 2004] or non-equilibrium 
[Gonzales-Garcia et al. 2002]. Five types of dynamics are possible, including the 
coexistence of producers and non-producers at a stable equilibrium. is diversity of 
dynamics was not captured by previous game theory models based on pairwise 
interactions or by previous models of public goods in evolutionary game theory.  
 Tumor heterogeneity has important implications for diagnosis and treatment. e 
results help us understand anti-cancer therapies that attack growth factors, either 
directly (using drugs like Avastin that target the growth factors) or indirectly (using 
RNA interference). While it was suggested that attacking growth factors may be less 
susceptible to the evolution of resistance [Pepper 2012, Aktipis & Nesse 2013], the 
results shown here suggest that the issue is not so simple. In fact, it is clear that, in spite 
of the initial enthusiasm, anti-angiogenic drugs, one of the most prominent examples of 
therapies based on the disruption of growth factors, have been disappointing. A drug 
like Avastin, which was the best selling drug for Roche in the past few years, only extend 
overall survival of patients with certain types of cancer by a few months, which are 
followed by relapse [Amit et al. 2013]. 
 e rationale of the analysis is that when one reduces the amount of a growth 
factor, the immediate result is a sudden reduction in tumor growth, because the 
threshold necessary to achieve the original benefit is not reached; as a consequence the 
growth rate of the tumor  immediately declines. At the same time, however, the amount 
of growth factors necessary for the population to grow increases (because part of them 
are disrupted by the therapy), which changes the dynamics of the system; unfortunately, 
it changes in the wrong direction: by increasing the threshold, one increase the 
frequency of producers at equilibrium, which explains relapse simply as the new 
equilibrium reached by the system under the new conditions. Analysing anti - growth 
factor drugs as methods that increase the threshold of a public goods game reveals that 
the initial expectations of stability for these therapies were based on faulty evolutionary 
predictions. While it is too early to evaluate the eﬃcacy of RNAi treatments, it seems 
reasonable that even silencing the gene for a growth factor should incur a similar 
problem and be susceptible to the evolution of resistance. As pointed out by Pepper 
[2012] therapies that target growth factors are certainly a more evolutionary robust 
approach that conventional drugs that target cells directly. As we have show, however, an 
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anti - growth factor drug must be evolutionarily stable in order to be eﬀective. Besides 
eﬃcacy, latency was also shown here to be fundamental for the success of such therapies. 
 In order to have quantitative results that may help design proper therapies, the 
methods used should be extended to take into account more realistic features of cancer 
development including, for example, spatial structure, since cells will form clusters of 
producers and non-producers with their own dynamics. It is known, however, that 
assortment in spatially structured populations does not change the dynamics 
qualitatively if benefits are sigmoid (which is our case) [Archetti & Scheuring 2012; 
Perc et al. 2013].
 Drugs that target growth factors may be used in combination with other therapies, 
such as chemotherapy. Since chemotherapy is more eﬀective against rapidly dividing 
cells, however, it will aﬀect preferentially non-producing cells (which grow faster) and 
therefore confer a benefit to producer cells, which would not help the treatment. An 
evolutionarily stable therapy should modify the dynamics to leads to the extinction of 
the producer cells. As we have seen, extinction of the producer cells is possible, 
depending on the shape of the benefit function, if the cost/benefit ratio of producing the 
growth factor is high enough, group size is large enough and if the initial amount of 
non-producer cells is above a critical threshold. e cost/benefit ratio could be changed 
by varying the amount of exogenous growth factor; group size could be changed by 
varying the diﬀusion range of the factor; the critical amount of non-producer cells can 
be achieved by autologous cell therapy, using cancer cells harvested from the patient, in 
which genes coding for growth factors have been knocked out. Such therapy would be 
stable against the evolution of resistance because mutants that produce growth factors, 
having a higher cost, would not invade. e very reason why most current therapies fail 
in the long term, the evolutionary response of the tumor, in this case would lead to the 
desired eﬀect: the extinction of the producer cells and the long-term stability of the 
treatment.
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Titles and legends to figures
Figure 1. e five types of dynamics of growth factor production. e evolutionary 
dynamics of growth factor production depends on how the benefit of the growth factor 
changes as a function of the fraction of of producer cells. e equilibria are found where 
β(x)=c, that is, where β(x) intersects the constant line c (the cost of producing the 
growth factor; dashed line); the fraction of producers increases if β(x)>c and decreases if 
β(x)<c; the arrows show the direction of the change. ere are five possible types of 
dynamics: A: Only x=0 is stable. B: Only x=xs is stable. C: Both x=0 and x=xs are stable. 
D: Both x=0 and x=1 are stable. E: Only x=1 is stable.  A: s=0.5, h=0.3, c=0.12. B: s=0.5, 
h=0.7, c=0.02, C: s=0.5, h=0.3, c=0.1. D: s=0.5, h=0.3, c=0.02. E: s=0.1, h=0.3, c=0.02. 
n=20.
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Figure 2. Types of evolutionary dynamics as a function of the parameters. Each plot is 
drawn for diﬀerent values of s (the steepness of the benefit function) and h (the 
threshold of the benefit function), that is, for diﬀerent types of benefit of the growth 
factor (a function of the fraction of producers, represented by the small panels on the 
top right; see Figure 1), and shows the type of dynamics as a function of c (the cost of 
producing the growth factor) and n (group size). ere are 5 types of dynamics (see 
Figure 1). A: Only x=0 is stable. B: Only x=xs is stable. C: Both x=0 and x=xs are stable. 
D: Both x=0 and x=1 are stable. E: Only x=1 is stable. Colors show the values of the 
stable (xs) or unstable (xu) equilibria.
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Figure 3. Eﬀect of the parameters on the equilibrium fraction of producers. e fraction 
of producers is plotted over time for diﬀerent values of c (the cost of production), n (the 
number of cells within the diﬀusion range of the growth factor), h (the inflection of the 
benefit function) and s (the steepness of the benefit function), starting from the same 
initial frequencies. 
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Figure 4. Evolution of resistance to anti-cancer treatments that target growth factors. A 
population reaches an equilibrium (after about 200 generations) in which producers and 
non producers of growth factors coexist. When, at generation 1000, a drug is introduced 
that increases the threshold h from 0.1 to 0.98 (that is, it impairs almost completely the 
growth factor produced by the tumor), fitness immediately declines and remains low for 
a few generations; if the transition to the new dynamics if fast enough (20 generations), 
producers go extinct. If the transition is slower, however (50 generations) the frequency 
of producers increases, and after a few generations fitness reaches levels comparable to 
the pre-drug treatment, as the fraction of producers approaches a new equilibrium. 
n=50; c=0.01; s=0.2
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Figure 5. Designing evolutionarily stable anti - growth factors treatments. At 
generation 1000, a drug is introduced that increases the threshold h from 0.1 to h*, in t 
generations. n=50; c=0.01; s=0.2. A: h*=0.9; variable t, from 5 to 100 generations. If the 
transition is not fast enough, producers reach a new equilibrium (here the transition 
must occur in 20 generations or less). B: t=20; variable h*, from 0.3 to 0.98. If the 
treatment does not reduce enough the available amount of growth factor, producers 
reach a new equilibrium (here the reduction must be strong enough to change the 
threshold from 0.1 to at least 0.9).
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